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1  Introduction
If I take a free decision, how does this express itself physically?  If God acts in this world, how does he do
so?  The answers to those two questions may be different or the same.  Here we sketch a typology of
possible  answers.   Chapter 2 deals  with  the possibility  that  there is  no  freedom; chapter 3 with  the
possibilities for immanent, synchronic influence; chapter 4 with the possibilities for immanent diachronic
influence; et chapter 5 with the possibilities for transcendent influence.
1.1  Randomness
Before we start, a remark is in order.  If the laws of the universe do not fully determine the outcome – if
the past underspecifies the present – there is  randomness.  An obvious candidate for  filling the hole is
freedom – instead of the regularity, it is some free decision to which the event can be attributed.  We shall
look into that option in section 3.2 below; here we are concerned with the notion of brute randomness, or
brute facts.  Something happens, and it was neither the regularity encoded in the laws2, nor some free
decision that is responsible, yet it does happen.  I must admit that for me this idea is incomprehensible: a
negative  observation (it cannot be attributed to regularity) is turned into a positive claim, without any
further basis.  It is not as if all possible attributions have been ruled out, but more like a throwing one’s
hands up in despair.   Physics is slowly recovering from this where it  concerns quantum effects – the
Copenhagen interpretation is held by an ever-decreasing fraction of physicists – so why introduce it here?
It merely means stopping looking for explanations, not giving one, while explicitly excluding an option not
otherwise eliminated – freedom.  But given that others seem to judge otherwise, I’ll try to accommodate
the option of brute facts in my overview.
So, what are the options for freedom to influence the physical world?
2  No influence
The first option is obvious – that there is no such influence.  The world ticks the way it does, and we tick
along with it.  If we think we are free, that is simply because the laws of the universe happen to have the
result that we do think so.
2.1  Hard determinism
One possible reaction is simple acceptance of the purported fact that there is no freedom.  It is hard, but
we’ll  just  have  to  swallow  it.   Whether we  believe  in  determinism,  and  whether we  swallow  the
consequence, depends on whether the world makes us do so – where the world is meant to encompass
the past, the laws of physics, and any brute events.
2.2  Immanent compatibilism
Bordering on the hard determinism camp is the immanent compatibilist one3.  Immanent compatibilism
seems a rationally untenable position.  Let me take the formulation by Simon Blackburn in his Think:4
The subject acted freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense.  This means that she
would have done otherwise if  she had chosen differently  and,  under the impact of other  true and
available thoughts or considerations, she would have chosen differently.  True and available thoughts
and considerations are those that represent her situation accurately,  and are ones that she could
reasonably be expected to have taken into account.
1 E-mail: truth@b.biep.org; orcid: 0000-0003-2582-4973; web site: https://biep.org.
2 I’ll use “laws” as a shorthand for “regularity described by the laws”, or whatever it is that necessitates them.
3 Immanent compatibilism is  normally simply called  compatibilism,  but I  add the qualifier to distinguish it  from
transcendent compatibilism, described in section 5.1 below.
4 His defining freedom on acts may have contributed to his seeming confusion.  That the acts happen the way they
do given the decisions seems uncontroversial, so the question is whether the decision is free.
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Even as a stipulation, this seems confused.  Expected by whom?  Not by an omniscient observer, because
there are precise – either  deterministic or brute – reasons why any consideration was or was not taken
into account.  In non-deterministic terms she may have been this close to actually taking it in account5,
but some neural threshold was just missed by a hair – as the laws predicted.  Or some brute decay of an
atom flipped the outcome.  No-one with the proper information could reasonably expect her to avoid the
decay, or have the laws of physics have a slightly different outcome.
Maybe it is meant as an observer-dependent notion: she was free  in my sight, but not  in yours.  That
would make freedom a property of agent-observer pairs, and a very different notion from what is usually
understood by the term, and no valid basis to build an account of responsibility on.  Are people more
responsible to those who know less about them, and therefore see freedom where better-informed peers
don’t?  And not responsible at all to an omniscient being?
Compatibilism implies compatibilist fatalism – whatever I do, and whatever its effects, it is all because it is
already fixed that I shall do that and get that outcome.  If I lean back and do nothing, it is because I was
determined to, and if I act, it is because I likewise determined to (or the result of some brute influence).
Maybe part of the causal pathway leading up to my acting or not may consist of my reflecting on fatalism,
but then I couldn’t  not have had precisely those reflections, with the outcome they had.  If some more
primitive fatalism (a belief that  whatever I do, the outcome is already fixed) drives me to inaction, it
couldn’t not have done that.  If on the contrary it incites me to action, likewise.
Objecting that the immense variety among people shows they are flexible is a non-starter.  The fact that
half the population has managed to be of the female sex doesn’t mean that I  have that option, and
likewise for skin and hair colour, and so on.  If people as a group are very varied, it merely means that the
dice rolled  differently  for  different  people,  and it  doesn’t  say a thing about  any one of  them  as  an
individual.
2.3  Ought
Whether in hard or in compatibilist shape, any morality has no bearing on behaviour.  Our thoughts about
morality, themselves caused by the laws and brute facts, may do so, of course – again precisely according
to those laws and facts.  Whether the judge condemns the culprit has been coded into the universe since
the big bang (or is the result of brute randomness) – it is cosmological minutiae that serve verdicts.
3  Synchronic immanent options
The second option is that there is an influence, namely that the act influences the world at the time it
occurs immanently.  So the influence on the world of my free decision happens at the instant I make that
decision.  Here we shall assume discrete time for ease of presentation.
For ease of explanation, let us assume a time-discrete universe.  Physical laws then try to describe the
world at time t in terms of the world at previous times.  Whereas a description of the world at time t in
terms of the world at time t-1 is not possible6, it seems descriptions in terms of the world at time t-1
together with the world at t-2 do suffice, leading to laws of the kind “If p has position x-d at time t-2, and
position x at time t-1, then it will have position x+d at time t”.  For a deterministic universe, such laws
together with some initial state of the world may fully describe physical reality – the laws will be functions,
giving a single output for a single input7.  There may be information loss, though: maybe there are several
possible pasts that would lead to the present.
If there is no overall determinism, there are two options:
1. Physics itself is not deterministic.
2. Physics is not the whole story – the universe is open.
Both could be true, in which case either or both routes could be taken to influence the universe.
3.1  The open universe
If the universe is open, the rules of physics merely describe what happens if there is no mind influencing
the outcome.  This is still fully compatible with determinism, namely if minds are determined too.  In that
5 Or to  not taking it into account; obviously the argument works both ways,  and likewise in the remainder of this
section.
6 That is, without introducing extra variables.  In practice introducing them is common, and to describe a particle at
time t by not only its position, but also its speed.  This is no fundamental difference with the approach given here,
however; just a matter of convenience.
7 With some extra wording, this can be expanded to “deterministic but for brute randomness”, where the main claim
is that the information that flows in is meaningless – does not encode any intention.
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case it might even be possible to incorporate the rules for minds into an extended physics, and we are
back at full determinism.
3.1.1  Conservation laws
We have discovered many conservation laws – how does that rhyme with an open universe?  There are
again several, more or less likely, options.
• Intrusions  are local  and/or  rare enough not  to be detected by normal  physical  experiments.   For
instance, if intrusions only occur in human brains in certain conditions of normality, it is quite possible
that they have never been measured.
• Intrusions  occur  far  from  observers,  and  then  influence  what  needs  influencing  through  normal
physical means.
• Intrusions are truly minimal, using chaos-like behaviour to bring about an effect.
• Intrusions average out.  Many of our macroscopic laws are statistical  effects from a very different
microreality, and describe an average behaviour.
• Intrusions  consist  of  information  only.   John  Polkinghorne  (XXXX)  has  described  how an  influx  of
information could lead to influence without breaking conservation laws.
3.1.2  The nature of freedom
So how would freedom fit in such a system – without reducing to something non-free?  A characteristic of
freedom is that free decisions can be attributed – they are not something that just happens, but for which
someone may be responsible, and not only at the moment the decision is taken, but also afterward.  So
something appears at the moment of a free decision, an aspect of the decision-maker that is the ground
of that decision.  Let us call it agency8.
Clearly freedom cannot be fully modelled – a full  model would amount to a proof of  the absence of
freedom.  Formulas can treat it as a hidden variable, however, and in the following we shall do so.
If  minds can influence the outcome the result  will  no longer be describable by functions of  the kind
described under 3 above.  Making agency explicit  can regain functional  laws,  by describing the non-
agency part of the new state in terms of older states plus the agency in the new state.  Adding time t to
the inputs allows one to do so, in a way that avoids self-reference9, because the input only references the
agency part of the state at t, and the output only the non-agency part.  If agency is left unspecified, the
resulting underspecification of the input leads to the known indeterministic laws.
Free decisions can be attributed after the fact – we can hold people responsible precisely to the extent
their decision was free.  So the agency remains, and is absorbed in our selves.  In fact, a self, a personal
identity, may be nothing more than the total agency of all free decisions taken, and Occam’s razor tells us
to suppose that until counter-evidence comes along.  Yet our self is one – I am responsible, not some “bit
of agency” in my mind.  In that respect agency is more a new property of the self than a new part of it –
the property of “having freely chosen thus”.  It is precisely the mind with the property of having freely
chosen X to which  X can be properly attributed,  and that can under appropriate circumstances 10 be
responsible for X.
To the extent that our self at time t constrains our freedom, agency only acts within the bounds of mental
laws.
3.1.3  Freedom as the mirror-image of causality
By  modelling  intentions deterministically  in  terms  of  the  resulting  choices,  the  full  model  can  be
symmetrical and in a way deterministic, with agency the time-wise mirror image of causality.
In that case there are deterministic laws describing the situation at time t in terms of the situation at
previous times, and those we call causal laws – and there are deterministic laws describing the situation
8 I have tried to find a word that doesn’t suggest “parts” or “elements”.  Agency is uncountable, as we shall see. 
9 Self-reference would allow trivial laws such as “The state of the world at time t is the state of the world at time t”,
which describes a function (deterministic output given the input).
The formulas treat agency as a hidden variable.  I have placed it at t, as that is where it stops being hidden, and to
prevent people from mistaking it for a hidden  physical variable that could be traced back in time (which would
remove precisely the freedom it is meant to model).  The “freeness” itself of freedom cannot be captured; only its
resulting indeterminism can.  Agency is concomitant with free decisions,  but neither the antecedent cause of them
nor their effect – vaguely reminiscent of a particle that comes into existence together with its antiparticle.
10 One major circumstance is  having someone to respond to.  God might well never be  responsible for anything,
having no higher authority to answer to.  Others include reason, understanding the criteria involved in justification,
and actually being morally subject to those criteria.
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at time t in terms of the situation at subsequent times, and those we call agency laws.  Causal influence
diminishes in forward time due to the influence of agency, and agency influence diminishes in backward
time, due to the influence of causes.
The state after the moment of the decision then defines the decision,  in a fully deterministic way when
looking backwards in time: the fact that I am a person having chosen X is what, looking backward, causes
me to choose X – but, looking forward, I wasn’t a person having chosen X up to the point that I freely did
choose X.  Causality works from the past to the future, whereas freedom works from the future to the
past.  This makes causation and freedom mirror-symmetric, the difference being the direction of the time
arrow.
3.2  Underdeterminism
In section 1.1 above we already mentioned freedom as an obvious candidate to fill the gap left by under-
determining laws.  If the laws of physics do not fully describe a situation at time t given the situations at
previous times, there is a natural place for freedom left.
If some loci of incompleteness of the known laws reflect a true underlying incompleteness, then physics  is
indeed underdetermined – its laws will necessarily be non-deterministic, relations, not functions, and our
freedom could exist in precisely that underdetermination.
3.2.1  Transcendent agency
If physical laws are truly incomplete, agency might act by “plugging” the holes – but there is another
possibility.  Instead of agency  filling the holes left by (physical and mental) laws, agency could be the
natural state of underdetermination.  In that case there would almost be an answer to the question why
there is something rather than nothing.
Transcendently, agency would not be time-bound:  free decisions simply are.  Given that fact, why isn’t
there nothing?  If there were nothing, there would be no laws, let alone laws that there be nothing.  So the
(non-existent) laws underdetermine, which means that there would be freedom, agency, and there would
be  a  free  decision  I  am attributable  to  that  agency11.   Since  this  is  not  nothing,  we  see  that  the
assumption that there be nothing leads to its own negation12.
We shall now consider two candidates for this underdetermination.
3.2.2  Symmetry breaking
Imagine two point particles of equal mass colliding.  The laws of motion tell us that impulse and energy
will be conserved – but not much more.  Taking their centre of gravity as in rest, their combined impulse is
zero and their total energy is m|v|² – both of which are conserved as long as afterwards both particles will
have the same speed as before, and still move in opposite directions.  Neither value, however, gives any
indication as to which directions that will be13.
Here the initial situation is symmetrical, but the outcome isn’t.  Whereas the example given is chosen for
ease  of  explanation,  and  not  for  realism,  spontaneous  symmetry  breaking occurs  in  many  ways  in
physics.  Some forms depend on minimal variations in the initial state, and would fall under section 3.2.3
below, but others are like the example given, reflect true underdetermination of the laws themselves, and
could constitute loci where freedom could have an influence.
3.2.3  Quantum freedom
According to among others the Copenhagen interpretation, quantum theory is necessarily incomplete –
Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty relation is not merely an epistemic limit, but reflects a genuine absence
of physical fact.
11 The freedom would be transcendent, translating to necessity from our immanent point of view.  For more details
about this distinction, see my How to Speak about a Supreme Being.
12 This is  almost a sound argument, but not quite, as if  there were truly nothing, the truth that  the absence of
determination equals freedom would not be either.  For an  argument why answering the final question  requires
transcendent mediocrity, see my Transcendent Mediocrity is the  Neutral   Position .
13 Maybe more realistic might be particles of which a mind could control whether they see each other (and bounce
off) or don’t (and pass uninfluenced).  Given that fields extend indefinitely, would it  be possible to switch off
influence and switch  it  on again  afterwards at  precisely  the right  moment  to  conserve the values that  need
conserving?
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A particularly promising interpretation in this context is the Conceptuality one of the theoretical physicist
Diederik Aerts (2014).  He shows that concepts naturally manifest quantum behaviour, such as obeying
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation, breaking Bell’s equations, entanglement, coherence, and so on.  
If I dream up a story, the world I create will typically be underdetermined.  A novel may say there is a
small fruit bowl on the table, without specifying the fruit in it.  Later on in the story, a character may take
an apple, or a banana, or a peach, or any of a huge number of possible fruits out of the bowl – there are
many more options than would fit in the bowl.
If in a story, Pat and Sam have a Roman-Catholic wedding, they get entangled.  Now Sam becomes an
astronaut and goes to Mars, and then we learn that Pat delivers a healthy baby girl.  At that point in the
story, Pat turns out to be a woman, and because of the entanglement, at the same instant Sam turns out
to be a man, despite the great distance between the two.  The Einstein-Podolski-Rosen experiment in the
macro-world, in a fundamentally non-mysterious way.
Within the resulting story, the fruit in the bowl had always been, say, apples, and Pat had always been the
woman in the couple, but actually those fact were created by what seems a measurement process.  That
is simply the way concepts behave, and the quantum (and, for that matter, relativistic) behaviour of our
world can be explained from the hypothesis that ultimately, the world is conceptual in nature.
The greater the detail in which the world has been described, the smaller the places where such under -
determination will tend to show up.  A novel only very broadly describes its world – we may read about a
tree near the house, without having an inkling whether it stands at its right or left, or whether it is an oak
or an elm, let alone whether it has an odd or an even number of leaves.  The world we live in, however, is
sensed by us to a much larger degree, leaving less space for such unspecified elements.  The quantum
level might be where our probing runs against the description level of the world – decisions have to be
taken whenever we probe, leading to the typical quantum behaviour of small elements of our world. 
So if God is thinking the world, that would explain its quantum behaviour.  Measurements correspond to
decisions (Aerts 2010), i.e. God deciding what the outcome should be.  This would make God as dealing
with the world temporal – not just in acting, but in actually  deciding how to act, and seems to have
important consequences for omniscience.
4  Diachronic immanent options
If we accept that, in McTaggart’s terminology, God stands in a B-series relation to the universe, other
options open up.  God might have created the world in such a way, that all  his decisions have been
“coded in”.  And if our consciousness resides in God, it might also be transcendent to this world, and act
on it in a comparable way.  Fully immanently, this might be modelled by God solving a vast but sparse
(i.e. widely underspecified) set of equations that includes equations relating our (and His) decisions to an
outworking14.
To us, this would look like determinism – from an A-series point of view the freedom would be in the
precise initial state the universe started from15, and these would be cases of  pre-established harmony.
Again we shall enumerate some options.
4.1  The lifeless universe
The state of  the  non-living part  of  the  universe encodes  an enormous amount  of  information.   Any
decision we make is likely influenced by a large number of particles from outer space interfering with our
brain processes.  If the state of outer space were carefully created so as to emit precisely those particles
that would lead to our thoughts and decisions going the way we freely choose, then no breaking of any
fully-determining physical laws would be necessary.
4.2  Deterministic quantum states
Hidden variable interpretations of quantum theory offer an obvious place for coding this information: in
those hidden variables.  For instance, the pilot wave model of David Bohm supposes a hidden state of the
pilot wave of each particle, which might be just so that it leads the particle to behave in the way that
corresponds with the free decisions at that moment.
14 Compare Douglas Hofstadter (1982)’s technique of Robinsonising to solve self-referential sentences.
15 Or the state “inherited from the infinite past”, in case of a universe without a beginning.  This other possibility is
implicitly present in the remainder of this chapter wherever we speak of the initial state of the universe.
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4.3  Chaos
Minute differences in the initial conditions can magnify through chaotic processes, and lead to radically
different outcomes.  Under the proper conditions, this fact could be used to encode the behaviour that
ought to happen in the initial state of the universe.
4.4  Physical rules
Our universe started with an exceedingly low entropy – but still an entropy larger than zero.  Possibly,
what we see as physical  laws are  merely  rules16 describing the regularity that is the result of this low
entropy.  In that case, because the entropy is low but not zero, we may expect (rare) deviations from the
rules we found.  These deviations might bring about the harmony between God’s and our free choices and
the state of the physical world.
4.5  Non-invariance
An intelligent ant walking along the ribbon around a birthday present might well formulate a “law” that
the ribbon always goes straight.  This might make her disbelieve any claim about the bow.  Yet, the whole
reason for the ribbon is the bow, and only some principle of pervasive mediocrity – a principle that stated
not merely that we are at a non-remarkable place in the universe, but that there are no remarkable places
in it – could undergird an argument that the bow cannot be there.
Likewise,  points  of  mind-matter  interaction  could  be  exceptional,  and  different  from  the  mediocre
measured matter-only behaviour that is being studied by physics.
5  Transcendent options
Once we fully embrace God’s transcendence, the field widens considerably – and mostly in ways we are
fundamentally unable to grasp.  That doesn’t mean they can’t be actual, however – limiting our notion of
the possible to what is graspable by us merely means adding another handicap to what finiteness entails
already.
5.1  Transcendent compatibilism
If God is the solipse at the top of the transcendence hierarchy17, there is nothing to constrain Him.  He is
the source of whatever fact is true in our world, including the facts of logic, and so on.  As such, he can
decide what the outcome of applying some law is.  We can get a vague inkling of this by looking at stories
featuring  a  deterministic  world,  e.g.  Douglas  R.  Hofstadter’s  Who  shoves  whom  around  inside  the
careenium?  or  What is the meaning of the word “I”.  On the level of the story, the world behaves fully
according to the deterministic laws governing it – yet what happens is precisely whatever the author
intends to happen.
In the case of a story written by someone on our level, this can only be done by being vague 18.  Not every
movement of every particle is described; if it were the story would either break the laws of its world, or
the outcome would not be in the hands of the author.  This is because we ourselves are constrained by
the laws of our world, including laws of logic that constrain the outcome of the application of laws.  God is
not so constrained, however, having no world above him: the outcome of a law application is whatever he
intends it to be19.
To us such a transcendent influence would be undetectable.  If  the laws are deterministic, the actual
outcome – the evolution of the world as it actually happens, would seem inevitable to us: if we know the
16 I make the traditional distinction between laws (which hold always), rules (which tend to hold), and chaos (where
no regularity is discernible). So the exception proves the rule, because if there were a law there would be no
exception, and if there were chaos there would be nothing to except from.  Hence the use of the phrase “as a rule”
to indicate the existence of both a regularity and exceptions.
17 See my Transcendent Mediocrity is the  Neutral   Position  for more on the transcendence hierarchy.
18 This  vagueness  reduces  the  example  to  transcendent  underdeterminism,  akin  to  the  version  described  in
section 3.2.3 above.  Such vagueness definitely is one transcendent option, but as this section tries to show it is
neither  the only,  nor  the most obvious option,  as  God has no need for  vagueness and underdeterminism to
influence the world.
19 This may lead to questions about evil – why doesn’t God let the outcome be better?  An abstract answer to that
would be that, being transcendent, He can also let the current outcome be the best.  This would lead into questions
about the Euthyphro dilemma (for which also see my From “Is” to “Ought” in One Easy Step), which are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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laws we can conclusively show that no other outcome would have been possible.  Yet, as seen from God’s
level, there is total freedom.
If our will is transcendent, “implemented by God”, as it were, then our decisions could be free, and the
world could reflect those decisions in its evolution according to the deterministic laws it obeys.
And so we see that transcendent compatibilism can provide what immanent compatibilism cannot: true
(and even complete) freedom in a fully deterministic world.
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